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COMMENTS
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people consider automobiles' to be a safe place to store personal
effects.2 But just as innocent articles can be kept in automobiles, so can
contraband or other evidence of crime. Thus, courts have had to apply the
law of search and seizure-which once spoke primarily to the security of
the home 3-to a new setting. The courts' treatment has not always been
consistent.' With a proper warrant, the search of an automobile is valid;5
but the more perplexing question is, "When is such a search valid without
a warrant?" This comment attempts to answer that question, in part, by
surveying and cataloging the law in Virginia on warrantless searches and
seizures of automobiles.
To be valid, any search or seizure must comply with the fourth amend-
ment to the Constitution.' Since Mapp v. Ohio7 the amendment has been
applied equally to state and federal law officials; evidence seized in viola-
tion of the amendment has been excluded from the trier of fact. A state
could provide its citizens with more than the minimum protection,8 but so
1. The term "automobile" is used inclusively to mean cars, trucks, vans, and other self-
propelled vehicles for personal use. "Automobile" is used in place of the others only for the
sake of familiarity and convenience.
2. With the advent of campers, vans, and the like, vehicles are expected to be private,
especially since almost all are equipped with locks, glove compartments and trunks.
3. United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2481-83 (1977). The amendment was never
limited to homes or offices, but "the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the
colonists and which were foremost on the minds of the framers, were those involving invasions
of the home . . . ." Id. at 2482. Now, it is known that the fourth amendment "protects
people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
4. E.g., Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973) (inventory searches). The Supreme Court has often
been divided. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (5-4 pluralty decision); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (5-4 decision); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (5-4 plurality decision); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (5-4 decision). See
also Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in
Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MFRcrER L. REv. 987 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Moylan]; 53
N.C.L. REv. 722 (1975); 87 HARv. L. Rav. 835 (1974).
5. See Garris v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 26, 181 S.E.2d 631 (1971).
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961); Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 611,
202 S.E.2d 894 (1974).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule enforced by 16 states even though not part of due process.)
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far, Virginia has not done so? Thus, the sole governing language is that of
the fourth amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.10
There has been much debate on the construction of the amendment. For
a time it was thought that, with or without a warrant, the search had only
to be reasonable under all the circumstances to be constitutional." Now,
it is well settled that the second part of the amendment, the warrant
clause, qualifies the first; thus, there is a "warrant requirement"-searches
without a warrant are per se unreasonable (and therefore unconstitutional)
subject to a few narrowly construed exceptions.12
9. Until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the state did not even enforce the exclusionary
rule. Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 615, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974) (Poff, J., concurring).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 768 (1969); see Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 614-15, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974)
(Poff, J., concurring).
12. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)): "[t]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions.' "See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
97 S. Ct. 619, 628-29 (1977); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Lugar v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 609, 611, 202 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1974); Vass v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
740, 743, 204 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1974).
The general exceptions to the requirement of a warrant currently recognized by the Su-
preme Court include the following: warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (The
"hot pursuit" exception has also been given the label of "emergency circumstances" excep-
tion, in recognition that the hot pursuit of a felon may be only one of many possible emergency
circumstances requiring prompt attention. For a more thorough discussion see Bacigal, The
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RIcH. L. Rzv. 249 (1975)); stop and
frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); the plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and the Carroll
doctrine, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (This exception is more generally
recognized as the "automobile exception").
Most of these exceptions require the presence of exigent circumstances. The warrant re-
quirement serves to further several constitutional objectives. First, the prior determination
by a magistrate of the necessity of a search is intended to eliminate searches not based upon
probable cause. Another objective is to eliminate the possibility of a general exploratory
rummaging in a person's belongings. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,467-68 (1971).
In addition, the requirement of a warrant also serves to prevent hindsight from affecting the
evaluation of the reasonableness of the search or seizure. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
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Automobiles have the benefit of the warrant requirement since they are
"effects" under the fourth amendment." However, the courts have tradi-
tionally treated automobiles differently from homes and offices when judg-
ing the constitutionality of a search-warrantless searches of automobiles
have been permitted where searches of homes or offices would not be."
"Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements gov-
ern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is
significantly less than that relating to one's home or office. '"'5
In fact, there are two broad categories of cases in which warrantless
searches of automobiles have been upheld. The "automobile exception"
proper, or Carroll"6 doctrine, involves the search of an automobile on the
highway where there is probable cause to support the search and "where
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality .. ". . ' Warrantless searches of automobiles
have also been upheld where the police had no probable cause and where
there was no exigency." These cases do not fall within the true "automobile
exception"; rather, the evidence is admitted under a variety of other, gen-
eral exceptions to the warrant requirement as they apply to automobiles.
Evidence may be seized when discovered in plain view or when" found
incident to arrest, or at other times when the Carroll doctrine does not
apply.
I. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES WHERE PROBABLE CAUSE IS NOT
PRESENT
Although probable cause must ordinarily be present to support a
search," there are instances of non-searches, limited searches, or justified
searches where probable cause is not necessary.
13. United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2484 (1977) (dictum); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
14. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,
589 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
15. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
16. Named after Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Part m infra.
17. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (1971).
18. E.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971); Shirley v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977). See Part I infra.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[Pirobable cause deals with probabilities concerning the
factual and practical considerations in everyday life as perceived by reasonable and prudent
persons." Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 876, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). See Oritz
v. United States, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
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A. Plain View
The theory of plain view underlies most of the legitimate searches con-
ducted without probable cause. "What the 'plain view cases' have in com-
mon is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertantly across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused." 2 Many of the other exceptions'
supply the justification for the intrusion, to which the inadvertance of
plain view is added, to make the seizure legitimate.
The meaning of inadvertence has plagued the courts.Y The Virginia
Supreme Court has not fully recognized it." In Cook v. Commonwealth,
2 4
the court stated that it is "entirely lawful . . . for a police officer who is
on a public street or sidewalk to look, either deliberately or inadvertently,
into an automobile parked on the street and to observe what is exposed
therein to open view." 5 The court relied heavily on the fact that the auto-
mobile was parked in public28 and reasoned that any object which a person
266, 269-72 (1973); Dyke v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1968); Brineger v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-77 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-62 (1925);
notes 84 to 87 and accompanying text infra.
20. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). The inadvertence requirement
implies that the discovery of the incriminating object not be anticipated, so that it may be
said that no search has been conducted for that particular object. Id. at 466-71.
Technically, there is no "search" involved in the seizure of evidence in plain view. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968) Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 623, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974) (Poff, J., concurring).
21. Benign purpose searches, see part II.B. infra; inventory searches, see part II.C. infra;
searches of forfeited automobiles, see part l.D. infra; and inspections of identification num-
bers, see part ll.E. infra.
22. See Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 622-27, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974) (Poff, J.,
concurring); North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09, 1314-15 (1972);
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 308-11 (1974).
23. Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 89-90, 235 S.E.2d 443, 445-46 (1977); Lugar v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 612-13, 202 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1974).
24. 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
25. Id. at 73, 216 S.E.2d at 50. In Cook, the police officer had a warrant to search the
defendant's apartment; he seized contraband from the apartment but had reason to believe
that all of the contraband had not been found. The officer went to the defendant's car, which
was parked in the street outside the apartment. Upon looking into the automobile, he ob-
served a brown paper bag. Protruding from the bag was a "plastic face mask", of a type the
officer had seen being used to smoke marijuana. The officer reached into the car and retrieved
the bag. Inside the bag, he found nine foil packages containing hashish. The court held that
when a police officer stands on a public street, looks into an automobile and sees incriminat-
ing evidence in plain view, he "does not. . . [conduct] a search in the constitutional sense."
Id. at 73, 216 S.E.2d at 50. Compare Cook v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975)
with Matthews v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1, 235 S.E.2d 306 (1977).
26. "There can be little, if any, expectation of privacy when one parks his automobile on
a public street and leaves therein, openly exposed to view, items of contraband or other
[Vol. 12:563
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"knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of protection by the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches.
2
More recently in Thims v. Commonwealth, 1 the court extended its hold-
ing in Cook. In Thims the automobile was parked in a private driveway,
not a public street, and should have been more protected. But since the
vehicle was exposed to public view, the court assumed again that there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy.25 In addition, the court stated that
the inadvertence requirement of Coolidge was inapplicable because no
search had occurred when the officer observed the automobile parked in
the defendant's driveway.3"
evidence of crime." Id. at 73, 216 S.E.2d at 49. From this, it may be inferred that the court
would have considered the inadvertence requirement, had the vehicle not been parked on a
public street.
27. Id. at 73, 216 S.E.2d at 50. See also G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S.Ct.
619, 628 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Poff maintained:
The hashish, packaged in foil inside a bag within the brown bag on the floorboard, was
not in open view, was not identifiable as contraband, and was not discovered except
by an "exploratory investigation", an "invasion and quest", and a "prying into hidden
places", i.e., by a search.
216 Va. at 74, 216 S.E.2d at 50 (1974) (Poff, J., concurring). Justice Poff suggested that the
search and seizure could be upheld on the basis of the Carroll doctrine. Id. at 75, 76, 216
S.E.2d at 51-52 (Poff, J., concurring). Inasmuch as the inadvertence requirement was devel-
oped to prevent the conversion of a limited warrant into a general exploratory search warrant,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 467 (1971), it would appear that the concurrence
is the better reasoned opinion.
See also Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974); Carter v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 317, 163 S.E.2d 589 (1968). In Lugar, the defendant consented to the officers'
entering the apartment to search for a fugitive. Upon entering, the officers observed controlled
drugs in plain view on the floor. Although the officers had no search warrant, they searched
the apartment for additional drugs. The court held that the consent to enter the apartment
for the purpose of looking for the fugitive gave the officers the right to make a reasonable
search of places where a fugitive might hide, but did not give the privilege to make a general
warrantless search. The seizure of the drug discovered inadvertently on the floor was proper;
however, the subsequent search of the entire premises was improper. Id. at 611-12, 202 S.E.2d
at 897. Lugar indicates that the court will be stricter in applying the "plain view" doctrine
when the seizure in question has been conducted on private premises, as opposed to an
automobile parked on the street.
28. 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977). An officer, who was given information by teenage
girls implicated with the defendant, learned that a stolen stereo was placed in the trunk of a
certain automobile, that the automobile was bought with a stolen and forged check, and that
it was parked in the defendant's driveway. The officer proceeded to the defendant's residence,
where he saw from the street what he reasonably believed to be the stolen automobile. The
court held that the officer was justified in seizing the automobile as evidence of a crime.
29. Id., at 92-93, 235 S.E.2d at 447.
30. Id.
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In his dissent in Thims, Justice Poff pointed out that Cook considered
only whether a search was conducted; the validity of the resultant plain
view seizure was not an issue. Thus, Cook could not validate the warrant-
less seizure of an automobile parked in a constitutionally protected zone.'
Justice Poff also maintained that the police knew of the presence of the
automobile and planned to seize it long before it was spotted. Therefore,
the failure to obtain a warrant was inexcusable. 2 On this analysis, it would
seem that the holding in Thims rests upon shaky grounds.
B. Benign Purpose Searches
In the course of their jobs, police often perform "caretaking" functions
with respect to automobiles.3 This frequent, non-criminal contact some-
times brings them within plain view of evidence or instrumentalities of
crime. For example in Cady v. Dombrowski,34 the police believed that an
officer's gun was in a car in their possession. They searched the car to keep
the weapon from falling into the hands of vandals but found bloodstained
clothing instead. The evidence was admitted. In Harris v. United States, 15
the police opened the door of a car in their custody for the benign purpose
of rolling up the window against the rain. When the evidence of a crime
was subsequently and inadvertently discovered in plain view, its seizure
was also allowed. The Supreme Court concluded that it would be unrea-
sonable to require a warrant in these situations.38
31. Id., at 94 n.1, 235 S.E.2d at 448 n.1. (Poff, J., dissenting).
32. Id., at 94-95, 235 S.E.2d at 448-49 (Poff, J., dissenting).
33. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973).
34. An off-duty policeman was arrested for drunk driving after a late-night accident. The
disabled car was towed to a private garage. The police, believing that the arrestee was
required to carry his service revolver at all times, made a search of his car and discovered
items in the trunk which eventually led to the defendant's conviction of murder. Id. at 435-
39. The Court upheld the warrantless search on the grounds that it was made pursuant to
the police department's non-investigative duties and motivated out of a concern for the safety
of the public who might be endangered, should the gun be found and removed by an intruder.
Id. at 447-48. See 87 HARV. L. REv., 835, 848-53 (1974).
35. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Cooper involved the warrantless search of the
glove compartment of an automobile seized pursuant to a statute authorizing the police to
seize any vehicle used to unlawfully transport or facilitate the transportation of any narcotic.
The search, which took place one week after the arrest, was held reasonable on the basis the
police had a possessory interest in the car, and had the right to search it for their own
protection. Id. at 61-62.
It has been argued that even if the possessory interest acquired by the police under a
forfeiture statute allows a warrantless search, Cooper cannot apply to cases where the police
have no right to deny possession to the car's owner. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 443,
452-54 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 87 HARv. L. REV. 835, 845-48 (1974).
36. The rule of Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), that warrants are not required
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Virginia has accepted the rationale which permits warrantless searches
for legitimate, non-evidentiary purposes." In Fox v. Commonwealth38 an
officer encountered an unattended vehicle parked off the road on a remote
secondary highway. Suspecting foul play, he investigated. The Virginia
court said, "it was proper for him to have sought some identification of the
vehicle, and to open the doors and look on the inside for that purpose. Such
did not constitute an unlawful search." 3 The discovery of marijuana on the
floorboard was labeled a "plain view" discovery."
Benign investigations are necessary when the purpose is adequately sub-
stantiated. The officer in Fox would have been remiss not to have investi-
gated what he found. Having no probable cause, he could not have gotten
a warrant. The problem is that it is easy to conjure a benign reason to
intrude either before or after the evidence has been discovered. A court
should, therefore, seek strong proof of the legitimate, non-evidentiary pur-
pose, before it admits evidence discovered during the benign intrusion.
C. Inventory Searches
When police impound an automobile, they characteristically inventory
the contents. 1 This practice developed in response to three "distinct
needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police
custody, . . . the protection of the police against claims or disputes over
lost or stolen property, . . . and the protection of the police from potential
danger ... ."I With these justifications, inventory searches might easily
for searches conducted with a benign purpose, makes the need for a warrant dependent on
the intent of the police conducting the search. Since intent poses difficult factual questions,
there is danger of pretext. But even when conducted for a benign purpose, the search must
be reasonable in light of the competing interests of the public and the individual.
37. See Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1073 (1972).
38. 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972).
39. Id. at 99, 189 S.E.2d at 369. Upon investigation, the officer noticed that the inside of
the vehicle "was in disarray as if a scuffle had occurred." Hence, the search was not an
unreasonable one. Id.
40. Id. at 100, 189 S.E.2d at 370.
41. Vehicles have been taken into temporary police custody for such purposes as removing
an abandoned or disabled vehicle from the highway, towing an automobile after a parking
violation, and impounding a vehicle for safekeeping pursuant to the driver's arrest. In these
circumstances, the police often conduct inventory searches of the vehicles pursuant to statu-
tory or departmental authorization. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973).
42. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). In the past, it has been argued
that in view of the violation of privacy that an inventory implies, special circumstances ought
to be shown to justify a warrantless inventory. See 87 HAv. L. REv. 835, 853 (1974). Mr.
Justice Powell recognized that the "[riesolution of this question requires a weighing of the
1978]
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be considered a subset of the benign purpose searches. Consistent with that
logic, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman43 upheld the rou-
tine, warrantless inventory search of a lawfully impounded automobile.
The procedure used by the policy in Opperman was found to be "standard
throughout the country" and not just some pretext for a general investiga-
tory search." The court also found that "it was not unreasonable to open
the unlocked glove compartment, to which vandals would have ready and
unobstructed access once inside the car. '5
One of the cases cited in support of Opperman was Cabbler v.
Commonwealth."6 Cab bler upheld the warrantless inventory of the defen-
dant's vehicle which took place after he was arrested away from home
while driving his automobile. Although Cabbler was decided prior to
Opperman, the reasoning is very similar.
D. Searches of Forfeited Automobiles
Automobiles used to transport contraband are often statutorily subject
to forfeiture." Virginia is no exception, permitting seizure and forfeiture
of "motor vehicles. . . used in connection with the illegal. . . distribution
of controlled substances. . ... ,, In Cooper v. California,9 the Supreme
governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions against the constitu-
tionally protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects." South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Upon balancing,
he determined that the interests of the police outweighed the citizens' interest in privacy with
respect to routine inventory searches conducted strictly in accord with departmental regula-
tions. Id. at 380. But see id. at 384-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
44. Id. at 376.
45. Id. at 376 n. 10. The Court did not consider whether police should be allowed to open
and search a locked glove compartment or a locked trunk. In such a case, the three "distinct
needs" of the police would be substantially lessened as justifications. See note 42 and accom-
panying text supra.
In addition, the Court did not hold that the police may proceed with an inventory search
when the owner expressly denies permission or is able to make other arrangements for the
safekeeping of his belongings. The "reasonableness" of a search made under circumstances
such as these would certainly be more questionable.
46. 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972). It can be argued
that Cabbler is broader than Opperman. The stolen goods in Cabbler were discovered not in
plain view, but in a locked trunk. Thus, Cabbler seems to place no limit on the scope of
automobile inventory searches. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976), Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 501, 211 S.E.2d
73, 75 (1975). See also Note, Fourth Circuit Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 423, 550-60
(1977); 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 151 (1972).
47. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-249 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This statute incorporates VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4-56 (Repl. Vol. 1973) relating to search, seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in violation
[Vol. 12:563
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Court held that such a forfeiture justifies the warrantless intrusion of po-
lice for the purpose of a protective inventory.
A countering argument can be raised from the Code of Virginia. Under
section 4-56 of the Code,5" the search of a vehicle believed to be carrying
contraband requires a warrant. It is true that the state supreme court has
carved out a set of "specifically recognized exceptions,"5 but the excep-
tions do not include the mere occurrence of forfeiture.
Cooper supplies another reason to uphold the search. It may be justified
in that the police obtain a possessory interest in the vehicle. For their own
protection, the police should be allowed to search."
E. Inspection of Identification Number
When an officer has legitimate grounds for inquiry, he does not need full
probable cause to inspect an automobile's identification number.51 In Fox
v. Commonwealth,-" the Virginia Supreme Court held that an officer, when
confronted with a set of "highly suspicious circumstances," had legitimate
of the law. Under § 4-56, "it shall be the duty of such officer to obtain a legal search warrant
49. 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Cooper was convicted of the sale of heroin to a police informer. The
evidence seized from his automobile was a small piece of a brown paper sack taken from the
glove compartment. Id. at 58. It matched the brown paper in which the heroin had been
wrapped. Id. at 63. At the time of Cooper's arrest, his automobile was seized and towed to a
police garage, pursuant to a California statute which provided that "any officer making an
arrest for a narcotics violation shall seize . . . any vehicle used to store, conceal, transport,
sell or facilitate the possession of narcotics. Id. at 60. See note 35 supra.
Cooper may best be viewed as the "routine processing" of a car which the police were
required by law to possess until forfeiture proceedings. Given this prior valid intrusion, the
case could then be analyzed under the "plain view" exception. See generally Moylan, supra
note 3, at 1037-43.
50. Va. Code Ann. § 4-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
51. One 1963 Chevrolet Pickup Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 158 S.E.2d 755
(1968). Those exceptions to the warrant requirement to which the court referred were: where
there is consent to the search; search incident to a lawful arrest; search of abandoned prop-
erty; and where that which is seized is in plain view. Id. at 508-09, 158 S.E.2d at 758.
52. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967). This justification overlooks the fact that
a forfeiture involves an involuntary transfer of possession, giving the citizen no opportunity
to protect his privacy interest in the car's contents, such as he would normally have in a
voluntary transfer. Given the typical criminal setting that accompanies most forfeitures, it
would seem that, upon balancing, the citizen's interest in secrecy outweighs the police depart-
ment's justifications. Thus, a better rule may be to allow the citizen, in the absence of a
warrant, to reclaim the contents of the car. See 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 848 (1974).
53. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir. 1971). The search must be based
on facts that would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the search is appropri-
ate. Id. at 376.
54. 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972). See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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grounds to seek identification of the vehicle.55 In Shirley v.
Commonwealth,5" the court stated that "[tihe search of that part of a
vehicle on which serial or identification numbers are found has been re-
garded as such a minimal invasion of a person's privacy that such a search,
if a search at all, need not be based on probable cause but on some lesser
standard of belief."57 The standard is not very clear, but if it is met, any
evidence of a crime discovered in plain view in the course of the search may
be properly admitted in the subsequent trial.5
F. Search Incident to Arrest
Unlike the exceptions so far discussed, a search incident to arrest does
not merely serve as the justification for a plain view seizure. The arrest
itself justifies a protective search, even if the search is "advertant."59
The difficulty is establishing the permissible scope of the search. The
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was first thought to allow only the im-
mediate search of the person of an arrestee for evidence of crime. 0 Soon
the doctrine was expanded to include a search of the premises where the
arrest was made. 1 The Supreme Court, reacting to the increasingly broad
permissible scope, began placing limitations upon the incidental-search
doctrine. 2 Later decisions negated the effect of these limitations. This
see-saw battle finally ended with Chimel v. California," where the Court
chose to limit the search-incident exception to a search of the person and
the areas within his immediate reach.
55. 213 Va. at 99, 189 S.E.2d at 369.
56. 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977). A statute requiring owners of public garages to allow
inspection of motor vehicles by the police (Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-9 (Repl. Vol. 1974)) was held
permissible under the fourth amendment. Id. at 436.
57. Id. at 56, 235 S.E.2d at 436.
58. Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 100, 189 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1972).
59. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 516-19 (1971) (dictum) (White, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
60. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum); see Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (dictum).
61. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 30 (1925) (dictum).
62. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931).
63. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947).
64. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The police, armed with an arrest warrant, arrested the defendant
in his home for burglary. The defendant's entire house was searched and incriminating
evidence was found. The Court invalidated the search by holding that it was unreasonable
to search beyond the defendant's person and the area from which he might have gained
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 762-63, overruling United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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Five years before Chimel, the Court had held that the warrantless search
of the impounded car owned by a person arrested for vagrancy could not
be justified as incidental to arrest. The Court considered the search too
remote in time and place. 5 Chimel revived this decision, and as a conse-
quence, courts began holding Chimel applicable to automobile searches."
By virtue of Chimel, the warrantless search of an entire automobile,
trunk included, should not be allowed solely under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception. 7
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the
need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an
officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate con-
trol. But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or
place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then
a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to
arrest.66
Traffic arrests present their own problems. Police may conduct a full
search of a person incident to an arrest for a traffic violation only in instan-
ces involving "full custodial arrests."69 Where the officer intends only to
issue a traffic citation or Warning, a limited "pat-down" search is justified
if the officer maintains a reasonable suspicion that his personal safety is
in jeopardy."
There are few post-Chimel Virginia decisions dealing with the search-
65. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
66. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970).
67. But see 87 HARV. L. REv. 835, 836 n.8 (1974).
68. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
69. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 221 nn. 1 & 2 (1973); Alwin, Searches During Routine Traffic Stops after Robinson and
Gustafson: A Re-Examination of the Illinois Distinction Between "Ordinary Traffic Viola-
tions" and "Criminals," 7 LOYoLA U.L.J. 853, 853-54 (1976).
70. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977). (A bulge in the jacket of an automobile
operater stopped for a traffic violation permitted the officer to conclude that the man was
armed and therefore dangerous to the safety of the officer. Thus, a limited "pat-down" search
was justified.)
It has been established that a stop-and-frisk search may be made of an occupant of an
automobile, just as it may be made of a pedestrian, if there are reasonable grounds for the
stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972). Because the stop and frisk is a lesser intrusion than a search and seizure, it may be
permitted on predicates less substantial than probable cause. There must, however, be at
least a reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1960); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968). See also Simmons v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 552, 231 S.E.2d 218 (1977).
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incident-to-arrest exception as it applies to automobiles." In one case, the
Virginia Supreme Court was unclear whether the search of an entire
pickup truck was conducted pursuant to the search-incident exception or
the Carroll exception." Another decision provided dictum to the effect that
the Chimel limitations would be "applicable where the predicate for the
warrantless search is a lawful arrest."" Finally, in Hollis v.
Commonwealth,4 the court stated that "[ilncident to . . . arrest, the
officers could make a warrantless search of Hollis's person and of the area
within his reach where he might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence." 5
Therefore, it seems that Virginia courts must apply Chimel standards to
search-incident-to-arrest cases in which the arrestee is in an automobile.7 6
G. Consent Searches
Searches with consent are the final category of valid, warrantless
searches without probable cause. Consent searches are not so much an
exception to the warrant requirement as a waiver of rights.71 If consent has
been voluntarily given by the person subjected to the search 8 or someone
else with a possessory interest in the automobile, 9 the automobile may be
searched.
71. Kirby v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 806, 167 S.E.2d 411 (1969), was decided prior to
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 613, 202
S.E.2d 894, 898 (1974), the court recognized Chimel as controlling precedent for search-
incident doctrine. But, Lugar involved the search of an apartment, rather than an automo-
bile, and cannot be relied upon to show that the court will apply Chimel standards to an
automobile. Id. at 610, 202 S.E.2d at 896. See also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354,
228 S.E.2d 685 (1976).
72. Smith v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 606, 186 S.E.2d 65 (1972).
73. Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 125, 216 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1975). An officer who
had probable cause to believe that narcotics were being transported in an automobile driven
by the defendant stopped and conducted a warrantless search of the entire vehicle. The court
held that police officers are entitled to stop and search a moving vehicle if they have probable
cause to believe that it contains contraband. Id. at 125-26, 216 S.E.2d at 62.
74. 216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887 (1976). An officer, acting on an informant's tip, observed
the defendant, who was seated in an automobile, remove what appeared to be a hand-rolled
cigarette from his mouth and throw it to the floor. The court held that after opening the car
door and detecting an odor of marijuana the officer could, incident to arrest, make a warrant-
less search of the defendant and the area within his immediate reach. Id. at 878, 223 S.E.2d
at 890.
75. Id.
76. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972).
77. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-46 (1973).
78. Hall v. Peyton, 299 F. Supp. 613, 614 (1969). One 1963 Chevrolet Pickup Truck v.
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 508, 158 S.E.2d 755, 758, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968).
79. Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970).
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H. Summary
To have a valid search, the police must usually have both probable cause
and a magistrate's warrant. As the above sections indicate, there are in-
stances when officers may search an automobile or seize evidence from it
even though there is neither probable cause nor a warrant. The courts have
typically justified these decisions by pointing to the necessity of efficient
law enforcement. But since these instances are furthest away from the
basic construction of the amendment,"5 the courts should apply them cau-
tiously.
III. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES WHERE PROBABLE CAUSE IS
NECESSARY
In Carroll v. United States,"1 the Supreme Court recognized that the
presence of exigent circumstances,"2 coupled with the existence of probable
cause,s3 made the requirement of a search warrant unreasonable. When-
ever these two criteria are satisfied, the warrantless search of an automo-
bile may proceed under the Carroll doctrine.
The criteria of probable cause is uniform. Officers have probable cause
to search whenever "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge,
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
• ..[contraband] was being transported in the automobile which they
stopped and searched."8 Thus, when the police observed a vehicle match-
ing the description of an automobile allegedly used in a recent burglary,
they had probable cause to search. But, probable cause was found lacking
80. See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
81. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Two federal officers stopped a vehicle which they believed to
contain contraband alcohol. A search on the highway revealed the contraband stashed behind
the back seat of the automobile. The Court upheld this warrantless search on the basis of
the exigency involved-the officer had probable cause to search, and the car was mobile.
Since the automobile could easily be driven away, it was impracticable to require the officer
to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 153.
82. The presence of "exigent circumstances" implies the existence of need sufficient to
override the interests of a private citizen. The Carroll doctrine is only one application of
exigency searches. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); 87 HARv. L. REV. 835, 836-37
(1974); note 12 supra.
83. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
84. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 171 (1949); Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 500, 211 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1975);
Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 358, 228 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1976); Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 216 Va. 874, 876-77, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976); Wescott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
123, 126, 216 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1975).
85. Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975). Within ten minutes after
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when the warrantless search of an automobile was predicated solely upon
a trooper's observation of a brown paper bag and a "pack of cigarette
wrapping papers" on the floorboard of the defendant's car.8" Just as the
fourth amendment requires that all searches and seizures, including those
made with a warrant, be reasonable, 7 the determination of probable cause
must also be based on the concept of reasonableness.
The criteria of exigency is more troublesome. Carroll held that a moving
vehicle in a public place creates exigent circumstances, 8 but the decision
was unclear as to the degree of mobility necessary. This question was
partially answered in Chambers v. Maroney8 when the Court extended the
scope of Carroll to allow an automobile to be searched at the station house
after the driver's arrest. Though it would seem that there would no longer
be any exigent circumstances after the occupants were under arrest and
the car under police control, Mr. Justice White maintained that "[t]he
probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the
mobility of the car. . . .""
a report of a burglary was broadcast over the police radio, the police observed a car matching
the description of the suspect's vehicle as it arrived at the residence of a "known fence". After
watching the occupants of the vehicle go into the "fence's" residence and remain there for a
short time, the police had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle. Id. at 500, 211
S.E.2d at 75.
86. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1, 235 S.E.2d 306 (1977). After stopping the
defendant for speeding, a trooper observed a pack of cigarette papers on the floorboard of
defendant's car. The trooper looked further, and discovered a brown paper bag tucked beside
the driver's seat. Upon opening the bag, he found what appeared to be marijuana. The
defendant argued cigarette papers are "intrinsically lawful objects", and could not alone
provide sufficient probable cause for the search or the seizure. The court reasoned:
[T]he cigarette papers were in plain view in the automobile, and perhaps, so was the
brown bag itself; but the contents of the bag were not visible. And although the police
officer did make "some connection" between the cigarette papers and the brown bag,
the connection was not combined with any other circumstance which might have
justified a rational belief that the bag contained contraband drugs.
Id. at 2, 235 S.E.2d at 307. But see Cook v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 686, 204 S.E.2d 282 (1924)
(police had knowledge of the defendant's reputation).
87. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
88. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see note 81 supra.
89. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
90. Id. Four men in a station wagon, whom the police had probable cause to believe had
recently committed armed robbery of a gas station, were stopped late at night in a dark
parking lot. All four were arrested and taken to the police station. A warrantless search took
place while the car was in police custody. Id. at 52. The Court held that the search was proper.
See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
91. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). A better rationale for the result in
Chambers is that since Carroll would have permitted a search of the car prior to arrest, there
is really no distinction in allowing the search to be made after arrest.
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobili-
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In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"2 the Supreme Court pointed to a lack
of exigent circumstances as the chief reason for invalidating a search of an
automobile. Even though the police had probable cause to search the car
parked in the defendant's driveway, the defendant was arrested in his
house, and there was no way in which he or anyone else could conceivably
have gained access to the vehicle after the police had arrived." Coolidge
served to halt the rapid expansion of the Carroll doctrine by requiring that
there be a real possibility of the car's being moved. 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia has applied the Carroll doctrine in nu-
merous decisions. 5 One typical case involved stopping and searching a
moving vehicle believed to be carrying historical documents stolen from a
museum." A more recent case involved the warrantless search and seizure
of an automobile by an officer who had reason to believe that the car might
be stolen and contain stolen property. 7
zation of the car should be permitted until the search warrant is obtained; arguably
only the "lesser" instruction is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the
"greater." But which is the "greater" and which is the "lesser" intrusion is itself a
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference....
Id. at 51-52. In any event, Chambers can be applied only to situations in which the initial
confrontation between the policeman and the citizen was on the open highway, with the
officer having probable cause to search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 n. 20
(1971). Under these circumstances, a warrantless search of the vehicle may be conducted
either at the place where it was stopped or shortly thereafter at the police station. Schaum
v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 501, 211 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1975).
92. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the police seized the defendant's car from his driveway
after arresting him in connection with a murder. The police had known all along of the car's
involvement in the crime, but they failed to procure a search warrant. The Court held the
seizure and search of the car unconstitutional, and found that a valid warrant was necessary,
since there was no reason to believe that the car would be moved. Id. at 458-64.
93. Id. at 462-64.
94. Id. For a more thorough discussion see Moylan, supra note 1, at 1004-08; 87 HARv. L.
REV. 835, 837-45 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977); Patty v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977); Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 216
S.E.2d 60 (1975); Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975); Vass v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974); McKoy v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 224,
183 S.E.2d 153 (1971).
96. Vass v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974).
97. Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977). The court justified its
decision in Thims by applying the "plain view" exception, and, alternatively by finding
probable cause combined with exigent circumstances. See notes 28-32 supra, and accom-
panying text.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Poff claimed that the majority discovered the exigencies
"in hindsight":
The "inherent mobility" doctrine is viable only when mobility poses a realistic danger
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Patty v. Commonwealth" indicates that the court will look diligently to
find exigent circumstances "where the police . . . [are] dealing with con-
traband goods concealed and about to be transported . . . in . . . [an]
automobile. . . ."I' The court held that a car which was "momentarily
inoperable," because th6 ignition coil had been removed, was still move-
able and could be warrantlessly searched and seized because "[a]nother
car loaded with more of defendant's companions, one of whom may have
had another key to the. . . ignition, could have arrived at any time, paid
the repair bill, required . . . [the attendant] to replace the ignition coil,
and driven the load of marijuana away.""' This decision was made in spite
of the defendant's contention that there was ample time to obtain a war-
rant during the five-hour interval between the arrival of the police at the
scene and the defendant's arrest. 1'
IV. CONCLUSION
For purposes of the fourth amendment, there is a constitutional differ-
ence between homes and automobiles. Many people, however, harbor an
that the vehicle may be removed before a warrant can be procured. The ...
[automobile] had no license tags or inspection sticker. The officer was in possession
of the ignition keys. The defendant and the girls who had implicated him were in police
custody .... Thus, the danger that the car might be moved or its contents removed
from the locked trunk was hardly realistic and certainly not an exigent circumstance.
Id. at 95-96, 235 S.E.2d 449 (Poff, J., dissenting).
98. 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977).
99. Id. at 155, 235 S.E.2d at 440. In Patty, three attendants at a gas station, who were
repairing a car left by the defendant, saw what they believed to be marijuana in the trunk of
the car when "the trunk flew up". The compartment remained open for about thirteen
seconds before they shut the lid. The attendants called the police. The police questioned them
and determined that they were justified in their belief that the substance was marijuana. The
police then set up surveillance around the area to await the defendant's return. As security
for payment of the bill, one of the attendants removed the ignition coil from the automobile.
Approximately five hours later, the defendant arrived, and attempted to start the car. The
police then closed in, arrested the defendant, pried open the trunk and confiscated over 450
pounds of marijuana. The court held that the warrantless search was not unreasonable.
100. Id. at 157, 235 S.E.2d at 441.
101. In Patty, information obtained from three citizens, combined with the arresting offi-
cer's own observations, provided the requisite probable cause for the search. Id. at 153-54,
235 S.E.2d at 439. Information received from third parties may be used to support probable
cause for the search and seizure of an automobile as long as that informant is shown to be
reliable. McKoy v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 224, 183 S.E.2d 153 (1971). See also Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 95, 225 S.E.2d 400 (1976); Andrew v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 179,
217 S.E.2d 812 (1973); McNeill v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 200, 191 S.E.2d 1 (1972); Guzewicz
v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730, 187 S.E.2d 144 (1972); Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va.
146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971). But see Thims v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 243 (1977) (informants held unreliable).
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expectation of privacy with respect to their automobiles as great or greater
than as to their houses. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."'02 It is true that individuals must sacrifice part of their privacy in
exchange for the privilege of using public roads, but this does not excuse
the failure to procure a warrant when it could easily be obtained.
Courts should strictly enforce the warrant requirement. If the exceptions
to the warrant requirement were narrowly construed, the rules would be
more certain. Consequently, police officers would be more certain of when
a warrant should be obtained. The ultimate effect would be to have fewer
claims of having been subjected to an unreasonable search.
Keith L. Phillips
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
I
